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INTRODUCTION

No, because this citizen does not appear to be an enemy combatant. If the citizen were an enemy combatant, then the answer
might still be no because the question strongly implies detention
without access to a neutral decisionmaker of a citizen seized in the
United States and outside of a zone of hostilities subject to the law
of armed conflict.
This question is too vaguely worded (perhaps deliberately so)
to know which "no" answer to give. 1 Whether the citizen is an
f Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. I seek a partial remedy to this vagueness by footnoting some assumptions.
In my answer, I assume that:
(1) the phrase "hold... without charge in a military brig" means detention by a
military authority without initiating charges under any (military or civilian) justice
system or otherwise permitting the citizen to "receive notice of the factual basis for
his [detention], and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533
(2004);
(2) the present-tense phrase "lives in Minnesota" means that the citizen was seized
in the United States shortly after returning from Somalia;
(3) the phrase "for six months" means that the citizen would not be permitted to
petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus or other relief, since such a pe5041
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enemy combatant is a very fact-intensive inquiry. What are these
suspected "links to al Qaeda"? Where and when "following a onemonth trip to Somalia" is the citizen seized? How do these links relate, if at all, to this particular trip? Is the failed state of Somalia a
weak ally, a redoubt for a motley collection of terrorists and pirates,
al Qaeda headquarters, an active zone of combat, or some portion
of all of these things? What is meant, precisely, by being held
"without charge" in a military brig? What is the purpose of this detention?
Recent case law provides no helpful precedents. Since September 11, 2001, three American citizens-John Walker Lindh, Yaser Esam Hamdi, and Jose Padilla-have been detained by the U.S.
military and then either transferred to civilian custody in the United States or subject to continued military detention within the
United States. 2 Their cases, however, do not answer this question.
Lindh and Hamdi were seized in Afghanistan and initially detained there under suspicion of fighting with the Taliban against
the Northern Alliance. When Lindh's citizenship became known,
he was transferred to civilian custody and brought before the U.S.
District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, which convicted him for the
crimes of supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive while in the commission of a felony.3 When Hamdi's citizenship became known during his confinement at Guantanamo Bay,
tition could result in the citizen's court-ordered release in less than six months;
and
(4) this U.S. citizen is not a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or the recognized
armed forces of any sovereign state.
2. An American citizen, Cyrus Kar, was detained in Iraq by the U.S. Military
for almost two months. Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82 (D.D.C. 2008).
Because he was not detained in the United States and "both charged and given
notice of the charges," his case is easily distinguished from ours. Id. at 85. Two
other American citizens-Shawqi Omar and Mohammad Munaf-were detained
in Iraq by the U.N. mandated Multinational Force-Iraq and then transferred to the
custody of the Government of Iraq for prosecution under Iraqi criminal law. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2214-15 (2008). The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that although Omar and Munaf were in the custody of the U.S. Military
(and thus a U.S. court had jurisdiction to consider their petitions for writs of habeas corpus), their detention was not under the authority of the United States
(and thus the release they sought as a remedy was denied). Id. at 2216-18.
3. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. John Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565
(E.D. Va. 2002) (Crim. No. 02-37A). At the time, these offenses were found at 50
U.S.C. § 1705(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2). Id. Lindh pleaded guilty and an Article III Judge sentenced him to twenty years in the custody of the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, a component of the Department of Justice. Id. at 1-2; United States v.
Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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he was transferred to naval brigs in the United States.4 The Supreme Court held that Congress had authorized his detention as a
person "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States there." 5 Neither man's detention
following capture in a foreign country and in a combat zone (admittedly in Lindh's case, contestedly in Hamdi's case) sheds light
on the President's authority to order the military detention of an
American seized in Minnesota.
In the context of the current struggle with al Qaeda, only one
American citizen is known to have been seized and detained without charge by the military within the United States. Jose Padilla was
detained in Chicago (upon his return from Pakistan) by federal law
enforcement officials executing a material witness warrant issued by
6
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. He
remained in the custody of the Justice Department for thirty-three
days before the President declared him to be an enemy combatant
and ordered him into military custody.7 Padilla was then detained
in a naval brig for almost four years until the President (without
changing his original designation) ordered Padilla's transfer into
the custody of the Attorney General to face criminal charges in
Florida. These charges were substantially 9 different than the reasons originally offered to justify his arrest. The Supreme Court

4.

Hamd, 542 U.S. at 510.
5. Id. at 516 (internal quotations omitted). The Court expressly declined to
decide whether Article II of the Constitution granted the President this authority.
Id. at 517. A little more than three months after this decision, the United States
released Hamdi from military custody and sent him to Saudi Arabia, where he also
held citizenship. News reports indicated that Hamdi's release was conditioned on
his agreement to renounce his U.S. citizenship. Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau,
U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured inAfghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, OCt. 12,

2004, at A15; see also Settlement Agreement, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Sept. 17, 2004,
8.
6. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
7. Id. at 571-72.
8. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, to Donald Rumsfeld,
U.S. Sec'y of Def., Transfer of Detainee to Control of the Attorney Gen. (Nov. 20,
2005),
http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/gwbll2005memo.
jpg. The Supreme Court permitted this transfer. Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084,
1084 (2006).
9. Attorney General Ashcroft interrupted his visit to Moscow to announce
via satellite that Padilla's initial arrest "disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive dirty bomb." US. Arrests Man
Allegedly

Planning

Attack

ONLINE

NEwsHouR,

June

10,

2002,
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declined two opportunities to decide the lawfulness of Padilla's detention.'l Thus, Padilla's case provides no judicial support for the
executive authority proposed in this question. Only by accepting
factual claims-that Padilla had openly carried arms against the
United States on a foreign field of combat-did a lower appellate
court conclude that the grounds for Padilla's detention were indistinguishable from those upheld against Hamdi (notwithstanding
the different initial justifications provided by the Government for
their detentions)."
Thus, "no" is not an answer that comes from recent case law.
My answer comes from long-established statutory and constitutional
law and the body of public international law known as the law of
armed conflict (a.k.a the laws of war or international humanitarian
law). First, the Non-Detention Act prohibits the detention of citizens except pursuant to an Act of Congress. The Authorization for
Use of Military Force does not provide a blanket exception to this
prohibition. The AUMF authorizes the President to use all "necessary and appropriate" force against the perpetrators of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. This grant includes the power to detain enemy
combatants, a long-accepted power under the law of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict is the lex specialis that provides the
legal context in which to understand what "necessary and appropriate" force is. The AUMF does not authorize the President to
expand that jus in bello power by stretching the concepts of enemy
combatant and armed conflict beyond their meaning in international law that binds the United States. The citizen in this question
does not appear to be an enemy combatant or even a civilian directly participating in hostilities. If this is so, then the AUMF does
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/dirtybomb_-06-10-02.html. A superseding
indictment handed down in 2006 charged Padilla and others with conspiracy to
murder, kidnap, and maim persons in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide
material support for terrorists, and providing material support for terrorists. See
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hassoun, 2007 WL 4180844 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 04-60001-CR).
10. First, the Court held that Padilla had filed his habeas challenge to his
confinement in the wrong court. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
Then, following its refiling and against the preference expressed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the Supreme Court hear the case on its merits,
the Court denied Padilla's petition for a writ of certiorari. Padilla v. Hanft, 432
F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (mem.).
11. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2005); see also infra note
19.
12. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541 (Supp. V 2005)).
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not authorize his detention because the law of armed conflict does
not permit it. On the contrary, the Non-Detention Act expressly
forbids it.
Of course, statutory protection of individual liberty is as fragile
as a legislative majority. A second, stronger source is found in the
Constitution's safeguards. Some argue that these protections must
bend to the extraordinary power that the President possesses in
wartime as Commander in Chief. I disagree. The writ of habeas
corpus, unless properly suspended, protects a citizen's access to
courts to contest executive seizure at all times. In addition, presidents have exercised their commander in chief powers subject to
the restrictions of the law of armed conflict. Those restrictions are
part of our law and prohibit detention in the circumstances described above.
Some contend that these twentieth-century concepts should
not encumber a President fighting a twenty-first century threat so
unlike any prior conflict. Advocates of such power often rely on Ex
parte Quirin. That World War II case is easily distinguished from
our hypothetical facts. What is more, it is ironic to selectively rely
on a decision buried in a bygone era of "traditional" war to defend
the radical, conceptual stretching that creates a global battlefield
on which only the President can distinguish innocent civilians from
enemy combatants. Such a novel legal claim cannot be extracted
from Quirin's factual and legal context, in which the meaning of
"enemy combatant" and "armed conflict" were both more clearly
defined and less contested than they are here.
Answering this question in this two-step way keeps faith with
past efforts to define the limits of presidential power in wartime. In
the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Black sought authority for the President's power "either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."14 Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in that case expressed the application of the President's war powers in a domestic
power.15
context as a function of Congress's additive or subtractive
13. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
15. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). It also contained a warning:
[The President's] command power is not such an absolute as might be
implied from that office in a militaristic system but is subject to limitations consistent with a constitutional Republic whose law and policymaking branch is a representative Congress. The purpose of lodging dual
titles in one man was to insure that the civilian would control the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presidential office. No
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In the case presented by this hypothetical, as was 6the case in
ebb."
Youngstown, the President's power is "at its lowest
II. THE NON-DETENTION ACT
Congress has forbidden the detention envisioned by this question. The Non-Detention Act states that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."' 7 This forceful statement was not
rescinded sub silentio by the AUMF. The AUMF might reasonably
be interpreted as such a statutory exception to the Non-Detention
Act in places and circumstances where the law of armed conflict
would make detention a "necessary and appropriate" use of force.
This was the case in Hamdi v. RumsfelA, in which the Supreme Court
held that the AUMF satisfied the Non-Detention Act's exception
requirement, but expressly limited this holding to the narrow circumstances presented by Hamdi's capture in Afghanistan.' 8 The
highest judicial authority to consider the effect of the NonDetention Act in a post-9/11 domestic context, however, held that
the Act forbids the military seizure within the United States of Jose
Padilla, an American citizen suspected of links to al Qaeda follow-

penance would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding
that a President can escape control of executive powers by law through
assuming his military role.
Id. at 645-46.
16. Id. at 637; cf. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chiefat the Lowest Ebb-Framingthe Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,121
HAuv. L. REv. 689, 693-94 (2008) ("Thus, the war powers issue that is now at the
forefront of the most important clashes between the political branches-and that
is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future-is the one Justice Jackson famously described in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyeras arising when the President's authority as Commander in Chief is at its 'lowest ebb,' namely, when the
chief executive acts contrary to congressional will."); Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L.
Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and ConstitutionalDesign, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2683, 2684-85 (2005) ("Absent textual or other evidence to the contrary, therefore, the AUMF should not be
viewed as authorizing presidential actions in violation of the laws of war. As a result, such actions would be valid only if they fell within the independent constitutional authority of the President.").
17. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2006).
18. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517-18 (2004). The Supreme Court
rejected the Government's position that it was "undisputed" that Hamdi was seized
in a combat zone (a position that the Fourth Circuit accepted), finding only that
Hamdi "resided in a country in which combat operations are taking place." Id. at
526-27.
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ing his return to the United States from Pakistan.'9
The Non-Detention Act was not passed by a Congress interested merely in declaring its principles. Congressional debate was
fierce because everyone knew what was at stake: revocation of an
executive power that had not been lightly granted. Congress acted
to strip the President of the power it had previously delegated to
declare an emergency and detain citizens suspected of presenting a
clear and present danger to the republic. Congress took back this
power twenty-one years to the day after granting it in the Emergency Detention Act of 1950.2
The Congress that passed the Emergency Detention Act feared
godless communists, not religious extremists. Its purposes, however, resonate with today's national security concerns. Congress
found that there existed a "world-wide revolutionary movement
whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other
groups (governmental or otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary" to destroy the AmeriCongress further held that individuals who "knocan way of life.
wingly and willfully" participate in this conspiracy in the United
States. 22
States "in effect repudiate their allegiance to the United
When confronted with the argument that the detention of
Hamdi and Padilla violated this statute, the United States argued
that (1) the Act was never intended to limit military detention, only

19. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). The Fourth Circuit rejected Yaser Hamdi's argument that the Non-Detention Act protected him because it found "no indication that § 4001(a) was intended to overrule the
longstanding rule that an armed and hostile American citizen captured on the
battlefield during wartime may be treated like the enemy combatant that he is."
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003). Two years later, that court
held that Padilla's detention, like Hamdi's, was authorized by the AUMF. Significandy, the court did not consider the locus of capture relevant given its willingness
to accept the parties' stipulation that Padilla had previously taken up arms against
American forces in Afghanistan. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 392 (4th Cir.
2005). Since the question above does not even remotely suggest the same factual
predicate in support of the detention of this Minnesotan, I do not enter the debate concerning the proper judicial role in assessing the factual record that would
support such a finding.
20. Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, tit. II, 64 Stat. 987,
1019 (repealed 1971). It should be noted that the emergency detention envisioned by that act was circumscribed by numerous limitations, including a probable-cause warrant requirement, a multi-level administrative review process, and ultimate access via habeas to an Article III court.
21. Id.§101(1).

22.

Id. § 101(7).
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emergency civil detention;25 and (2) this straightforward reading of
the plain language of the statute should be rejected because it
would interfere with the President's power to defend the nation
against attack.24 Both responses are premised on the assumption
that war and the exercise of presidential war powers are exceptional circumstances that the Act should not be interpreted to reach.
Neither response is persuasive because this premise is wrong.
It is one thing to interpret the Non-Detention Act not to reach
the detention of citizens captured alongside enemy combatants in a
foreign country (and certainly on a foreign battlefield). In that
foreign context, congressional authorization to use military forcewhether in a declaration of war or the AUMF-would satisfy the
Non-Detention Act. Detention (like killing) is an ordinary incident
of war already regulated by an accepted and respected lex specialis,
the law of armed conflict. But in a domestic context in which the
factual basis for that lex specialis is absent, it is hard to fathom why
Congress would expend so much effort to strip the President of
such extraordinary power against such a potent and duplicitous
enemy, but permit the President to circumvent these efforts simply
by shifting from civilian to military detention. The legislative history of the Non-Detention Act supports this natural reading. 5 "Both
the sponsor of the Act and its primary opponent repeatedly confirmed that the Act applies to detentions by the President during
war and other times of national crisis."' 6 The odious memory of
the internment camps established during World War II to detain
Japanese-Americans was repeatedly referenced in legislative debates
as a primary reason to support the measure. And notwithstanding
dire predictions that the Act "would tie the President's hands in
times of national emergency or war," the Act passed by a margin of
In other words, the Non-Detention Act
more than five-to-one.
28
means, and was intended to mean, exactly what it says.
23. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 52-53, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-7338).
24. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y.

2002).
25. This history is briefly described by Justice Souter in his concurring opinion in Hamdi Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542-45 (2004).
26. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718-19 (2d Cir. 2003).
27. Id. at 719. The measure passed 257 to 49. Id. at 720.
28. Albeit in a purely domestic context, the Supreme Court acknowledged
this fact, observing that the Non-Detention Act "proscrib[es] detention of any kind
by the United States absent a congressional grant of authority to detain." Howe v.
Smith, 452 U.S. 473,479 n.3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
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The AUMF does not supply the condition required to exempt
our suspect Minnesotan from the protection of the Non-Detention
Act. The Supreme Court held in the Hamdi case that the AUMF
authorized "the detention of individuals in the narrow category" of
those "who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part
of the Taliban." ' The Court held that such detention was permitted because of its purpose: to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again." ° In
categorical terms the Court stated that "indefinite detention
s1 for the
purpose of interrogation" is not authorized by the AUMF.
There is no claim in our question that the citizen is an enemy
combatant by virtue of his affiliation with a group against whom the
AUMF effectively declares war, or that the citizen has so continuously and directly engaged in hostilities that the protections of
civilian status have been lost, unless all of that is to be read into the
phrase "suspected of links to al Qaeda." And although one might
speculate whether the zone of combat is now global and America's
enemies too plural and shape-shifting to categorically enumerate,
such an expansive view of the AUMF was certainly not endorsed by
the Hamdi Court. Nor (as will be discussed below) can that view be
read into the law of armed conflict, which not only "can inform the
scope of Congress's authorization, [it] can also inform limitations
on that authorization."32 Although it is true that international law
is sometimes made by states stretching or even breaking it, in the
face of Congress's express refusal to allow such domestic detention
even in wartime, the President would be acting at the very nadir of
his power in doing so. In the absence of any act expressing Congress's intent to make an exception to the Non-Detention Act, this
statute prohibits this detention. Or, to put the matter more blunt29. Hamd, 542 U.S. at 517-18. In dicta, the Supreme Court restated this position in more general terms. Hamdi "would need to be part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners and engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States to justify his detention in the United States for
the duration of the relevant conflict." Id. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted). This restatement, too, does not cover our case.
30. Id. at 518.
31. Id. at521.
32. Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 16, at 2684.
33. The United States argued for, and the Fourth Circuit found, an alternative source of statutory exception in appropriations Congress made for military
detentions under 10 U.S.C. § 956(5). Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 54 n.17,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-7338); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467-68 (2003). Stephen Vladeck's thorough examination of
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ly, as Judge Wilkinson did in his concurrence to the denial of rehearing en banc in Hamdi's case, "[t]o compare this battlefield
capture [in Hamdi] to the domestic arrest in Padillav. Rumsfeld is to
compare apples and oranges."' 4
III. EXECUTIVE POWER, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, AND THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT

The Constitution limits the power of the United States to infringe individual liberty in wartime. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person's liberty shall be deprived during times of peace
and war alike "without due process of law." Under the Third
Amendment, homes may be seized to quarter soldiers only during
wartime and then only with the assent of Congress acting through
law. The criminal offense of treason is carefully defined in Article
III, which also details the procedure for its prosecution. The writ
of habeas corpus is specially protected. s5 It is a hallmark of our rethe legislative history of that statute puts to rest the notion that it could satisfy the
requirement of the Non-Detention Act. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Detention Power, 22
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 187-90 (2004) ("[1It is certainly ironic that the provision
that was eventually used to appropriate funds for the detention of JapaneseAmerican internees during World War II is today being cited as satisfying §
4001(a), a statute passed to explicitly repudiate the internment camps and to require unambiguous congressional authorization for the detention of all U.S. citizens.").
34. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). Of course, when the Fourth Circuit
was later asked to decide the appeal of Padilla's refiled habeas petition, it found
the grounds for Padilla's detention indistinguishable from Hamdi's. See supra
note 19.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In 1864, Lambdin Milligan (a lawyer) was detained by the military authority in Indiana, not as a prisoner of war, but because he
was suspected of links to a group of confederate sympathizers who engaged in various acts of what might be called terrorism. Milligan was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to death. His case is typically invoked for its pronouncement
that the laws of war "can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld
the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866). Care should be
taken not to read this rule too broadly. The Court was primarily interested in deciding whether the military had jurisdiction to convict Milligan; it did not reach
the question whether Milligan's military detention was unlawful because it was undisputed that Milligan's detention was permitted by the Habeas Act of 1863, which
permitted military detention by suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 11518. Congress passed that law in part out of concern that President Lincoln's suspension of habeas and summary military detention of suspected enemies was unconstitutional. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). But the Act
protected the interests of civilians by requiring that lists of such detainees be provided to the federal courts in their respective districts "as soon as may be practica-
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public that its citizens are not subject to arrest without charge, a
protection not found in many nondemocratic regimes. War and
other threats to national security place pressures on those protections that may be relieved by suspending access to the judicial
check on executive detention. Such suspensions are expected to
be no longer than necessary because they must be ratified by the
36
nation's democratically elected legislature.
The United States has argued that the Commander-in-Chief
Clause in Article II of the Constitution provides the power to detain
enemy combatants when the nation is at war. Sometimes this authority is asserted to be an inherent executive power, independent
of Congress's power to grow or shrink it. This no longer appears to
be the position of the United States, which has limited its claim of
executive authority to detain solely under the AUMF. s7
Notwithstanding this shift, the United States has consistently
asserted that the law of armed conflict provides legal authority to
detain enemy combatants, whether seized on the battlefield or off,
in the war against al Qaeda.3 The customary body of norms
ble" so that grand juries could be convened to issue criminal indictments of those
detained. Id. § 2. If the grand jury retired without issuing an indictment, or if
such lists were not provided to the courts, detainees were to be released. Id. For
an excellent brief examination of the case with an emphasis on the inconsistency
of its holding with actual practice of military commissions at the time, see Curtis A.
Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93
(Schroeder & Bradley, eds. 2009).
36. Justice Scalia acknowledges that "[e]ven if suspension of the writ on the
one hand, and committal for criminal charges on the other hand, have been the
only traditionalmeans of dealing with citizens who levied war against their own
country, it is theoretically possible that the Constitution does not require a choice
between these alternatives." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 564 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia presents historical evidence to
"refute that possibility," but concedes as he must the rare instances when citizens
have been subjected to military detention following their capture alongside enemy
forces. Id.
37. See BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, THE EMERGING
LAW OF DETENTION: THE GuANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 17 (Brookings
Inst. 2010) (reporting that the term "enemy combatant" has been replaced with
references "simply to persons detainable pursuant to the AUMF"); see also Hamlily
v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Although the government
has previously asserted that petitioners' detentions are justified, at least in part, by
the President's Article II powers as Commander in Chief, it no longer makes such
an assertion.") (internal citations omitted).
38. Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects:
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-CriminalDivide, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 369, 370 n.6
(2008) (citing remarks of U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor John B. Bellinger, III); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REv.
845, 845 (2009) ("[T]he Administration asserted rights and privileges imparted
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around which that law revolves is reflected in the Hague and Geneva Conventions adopted and revised over the course of twentiethcentury conflicts. 9 It is clear that this law "places limits on the exercise of a belligerent's power"-war is not an exercise free of legal
constraint.4 A central animating principle of that law is the principle of military necessity. As the United States teaches this principle to its soldiers, the principle of military necessity "authorizes
that use of force required to accomplish the mission. Military necessity4 1 does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited by the law of
war.

,

Interpreting the reach of the Commander-in-Chief Clause
since treaty obligations
through the prism of that law is appropriate
42
the Supreme Court
and
of
the
land
law
the
supreme
are part of
has interpreted the war powers of both political branches to operate within the context of jus belli.4 3 There is no question under this
under [the law of armed conflictl with respect to combatants-namely, the right
to detain without trial until the end of hostilities and the right to kill without warning."); see alsoJames A. SchoettlerJr., Detention of Combatants and the Global War on
Terror, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 69

(Geoffrey S. Corn, et al. eds., 2009) ("In [the global War on Terror], the Bush
Administration used its right under the law of war to detain and punish unlawful
combatants, as a method of warfare in its fight against terrorist groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban.") [hereinafter THE WAR ON TERROR].
39. Of most relevance to the issues discussed in this response are the Fourth
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The
Bush administration initially took the position that the law of armed conflict authorized a military response to attacks by al Qaeda, but that the Geneva Conventions did not govern United States conduct in the conflict. The Obama administration has expressed its intention to comply with the Geneva Conventions as
"treaty obligations." Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
40. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
para. 3(a) (1956).
41. U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CR. & SCH., INT'L &
OPERATIONAL LAw DEP'T, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 12 (Maj. John Rawcliffe

ed., 2007).
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
43. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J., concurring)
("If a general war is declared, its extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of nations; but if a partial war is
waged, its extent and operation depend on our municipal laws."); The Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1862) (noting that the right of prize and capture "has
its origin in the 'jus belli,' and is goverend [sic] and adjudged under the law of
nations"); see also id. at 687-89 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (defining war powers in
terms of the law of nations); Ex parle Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the
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law that the United States may detain an enemy combatant or civilian directly participating in hostilities, regardless of citizenship, to
prevent that individual's return to engage in further hostilities. But
this law does not provide the President, as Commander in Chief,
with the power to order the military detention of a citizen who is
not detainable under the law of armed conflict in the first place.
Nor can the President expand these terms to suit interests other
44
than this law's intended purpose: to prevent return to the fight.
The commander-in-chief power is limited by the international legal
obligations that the United States has freely undertaken and under
which itjustifies its use of military force. 45
very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war
as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of
war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.").
44. See O'Connell, supra note 38, at 862-63; see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, INrIERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICTS (Document 30IC/07/8.4) 7-8 (Oct. 2007) ("The question that

remains is whether, taken together, all the acts of terrorism carried out in various
parts of the world (outside situations of armed conflict such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia) are part of one and the same armed conflict in the legal
sense. In other words, can it be said that the bombings in Glasgow, London, Madrid, Bali or Casablanca can be attributed to one and the same party to an armed
conflict as understood under IHL? Can it furthermore be claimed that the level of
violence involved in each of those places has reached that of an armed conflict?
On both counts, it would appear not.").
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Professor Corn criticizes the
United States for "invok[ing] the authorities of war without accepting the obligations of the law regulating war." Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on
Terror, in THE WAR ON TERROR, supra note 38, at 6.

This view is not universally

shared. CompareAl-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("There is
no indication in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,.. .or the MCA
of 2006 or 2009, that Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President's war powers under the AUMF.
The international laws of war as a whole have not been implemented domestically
by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts.") (internal
citation omitted), with al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 178 (4th Cir. 2007)
("American courts have often been reluctant to follow international law in resolving domestic disputes. In the present context, however, they, like the Government
here, have relied on the law of war-treaty obligations including the Hague and
Geneva Conventions and customary principles developed alongside them. The law
of war provides clear rules for determining an individual's status during an international armed conflict, distinguishing between 'combatants' (members of a nation's military, militia, or other armed forces, and those who fight alongside them)
and 'civilians' (all other persons)."). The present scope of the Government's
claimed detention authority is thus highly unsettled. Wn-rEs, CHESNEY &
BENHALIM, supra note 37, at 17-21. For purposes of answering this hypothetical,
however, it is unimportant whether the law of armed conflict would permit the detention of members of al Qaeda, non-member substantialsupporters, or other inter-

5054

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:5

What is an enemy combatant (or, for that matter, an armed
conflict) in the twenty-first century? A war with al Qaeda seems to
fall outside the categories that the Geneva Conventions have been
understood to govern because this conflict is neither one between
two sovereign states nor one occurring only in the territory of one
state.46 Some have sought guidance in the law of targeting that protects civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities. '47 To some, the distinction between uniformed, conventional armies and civilians no longer seems as workable a line to
draw after 9/11. On the other hand, the emergence of a form of
conflict that one might call "transnational armed conflict" (i.e.,
one between one or more sovereign states and one or more nonstate organized groups that occurs in more than one sovereign
state) does not ipsofacto mean that the entire world is now a theater
of war in which the lex specialis of the law of armed conflict ap48
plies.
Those debates need not concern us here, for "no one is a
combatant in the absence of armed conflict" and "[a] rmed conflict
is determined today by facts of fighting." 49 There is no indication
that our Minnesotan is an "enemy combatant" participating in an
"armed conflict." This citizen is not alleged to have committed any
belligerent acts against our armed forces in Somalia or elsewhere,
or to have been preparing to commit one as part of an enemy
force. The citizen was not captured on any battlefield or during
combat with our armed forces-he has returned (presumably via
open, civilian means) from a trip to Somalia and is living in Minnepretations, not to mention what method of inquiry could be used to make such
determinations on the basis of available evidence.
46. See Geneva III, supranote 39, arts. 2, 3.
47. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 51(3),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also Schoettler,
supra note 38, at 78-79; Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term TerroristDetention and a US. National Security Court, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
85-87 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009); O'Connell, supranote 38, at 853.
48. INrr'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 44, at 7 ("[T] he ICRC does not
share the view that a global war is being waged and it takes a case-by-case approach
to the legal qualification of situations of violence that are colloquially referred to
as part of the 'war on terror.' Simply put, where violence reaches the threshold of
armed conflict, whether international or non-international, IHL is applicable.
Where it does not, other bodies of law come into play.").
49. O'Connell, supra note 38, at 853-54.
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sota. There is no claim that this citizen's "suspected links to al
Qaeda following a one-month trip to Somalia" are links to al Shabab or to other militant forces battling each other, the hapless government authority, or any American special forces who may be operating there. Providing material support to such groups is a
crime, with which members of the Somali community in Minnesota
have been charged.50 But there is a world of difference in fact and
in law between a criminal and an enemy combatant or a civilian
who directly participates in hostilities. To blur this distinction
would not only erase an important feature of the law of armed conflict, it would also render meaningless the protections provided to
citizens (at least) by the Constitution itself. Not having left the battlefield, the citizen cannot return to the battlefield-and so the
purpose of the detention is not served. Thus, absent the factual
predicates for the application of this body of law, the legal justification for military detention is missing, too.
Let's rephrase the hypothetical more precisely. What if the citizen was suspected of surreptitiously traveling between the United
States and Somalia with the aid of al Qaeda members there in order to commit some act of terrorism back home? Ex parte Quirin is
sometimes cited by those who wish to expand the meaning of
"enemy combatant" to include persons other than those engaged
in active fighting between armed groups and to stretch "armed
conflict" to global dimensions.5' The Quiin case does not support
this expansion. Quirin upheld the conviction by military commission of Nazi saboteurs who landed on Long Island, buried their
uniforms (which would have provided prisoner of war status-and
likely would have saved their lives-if they had been captured en
route), and set off with plans for various acts of sabotage and violence. One man, Haupt, claimed to be an American citizen, although the United States disputed his status. 2 Tipped off to their
presence, the FBI quickly arrested them all. It was "undisputed" by
50. See, e.g., James Walsh & Richard Meryhew, Alleged Somali RecruiterArrested,
Linked to Minnesota, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 11, 2009, available at
http://www.startribune.com/local/69713097.html.
51. The Quirinopinion was issued almost three months after the Court's decision was announced per curiam and the execution of the petitioners was allowed to
proceed. As justice Scalia noted, "[Quirin] was not this Court's finest hour."
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 570 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Louis
FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO

THE WAR ON TERRORISM 91-129 (2005) (suggesting on the basis of archival sources

a number of bases for support forJustice Scalia's understatement).
52. Quirin,317 U.S. at 20.
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the parties that "[a]ll had received instructions in Germany from
an officer of the German High Command to destroy war industries
and war facilities in the United States, for which they or their relatives in Germany were to receive salary payments from the German
Government. 5 3 President Roosevelt ordered their trial by military
commission "in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander
in Chief.. . " The prisoners were transferred into military custody, were convicted of various violations of the laws of war, and were
executed as spies.
The QuirinCourt could point to the additive effect of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches in the Articles
of War that provided one basis for the military commissions that
were convened.55 Perhaps this cooperation stretched the imagination (and the Court did not conclude that it was essential to its
holding), but this is a joint authority that our question eschews.
We are asked whether President Obama has the authority to detain
those he suspects of links to al Qaeda, without any further congressional support. As I've argued above, the AUMF does not authorize
detention by the military that would not be a proper application of
the President's jus belli powers. Such detention would not constitute a "necessary and appropriate" use of force. Because the NonDetention Act is a clear statement of Congress's rejection of such
detention, even in wartime, the President's power is at its "lowest
ebb."
The factual differences between Quirin and this hypothetical
are also stark. The issue in Quirin was "whether the detention of
petitioners by respondent for trial by Military Commission... on
charges preferred against them purporting to set out their violations of the
law of war and of the Articles of War, is in conformity to the laws and
Constitution of the United States. 56 That is a far cry from our
question: whether detention without trial by any civilian or military
court, indeed, without charge, would be lawful. Unlike the saboteurs in Quirin, who conceded their enemy status, there is no indi53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 27-29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what
extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create
military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation.").
56. Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added); see id. at 29 ("We are concerned only with
the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the national government to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses
with which they are charged.").
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cation that the Minnesotan in question would make such a concession. If the status of a detainee is uncertain, as it would be in such
a case, the law of armed conflict requires that a competent tribunal
determine that status.57 But, again, this question implies that no
such tribunal would be convened (for this purpose or for any other) to review the citizen's detention. Nor is there any suggestion in
the question that the "suspected links" to al Qaeda would lead President Obama to conclude that this citizen's detention was made
necessary by his or her belligerent acts. What are we to compare
to the confessions of Nazi allegiance, buried uniforms, and explosive material that stacked the deck in Quirin? If the writ of habeas
corpus is not suspended, both the Non-Detention Act and the Constitution require that the citizen's right to petition a court for release be unobstructed. 59 Neither process is contemplated by this
question.
IV. CONCLUSION

As noted at the start of this essay, this question is too vague for
me. I also do not like it for another reason. Its form encourages a
descriptive answer-does the President have this power or not?
57. Geneva III, supranote 39, art. 5.
58. Professor Goldsmith has uncovered Justice Jackson's unpublished opinion in Quiin, which suggests that the fact pattern of this question would have
troubled the Quirin Court even more than they were troubled by the facts of that
case. See RobertJackson, Draft Opinion in Ex parte Quirin (Oct. 23, 1942), eprinted
in Jack Goldsmith, JusticeJackson's Unpublished Opinion in Ex parte Quirin, 9 GREEN
BAG 2D 232, 236-37 (2006) ("If this were a military commission invoked as a substitute for courts and juries in the administration ofjustice to our own inhabitants,
it would to me present a quite different question, both of power and of statutory
construction.... The seizure and trial of these prisoners is not in pursuit of the
functions of internal government of this country. They are prisoners of the President by virtue of his status as the constitutional head of the military establishment
and their own status as enemy forces captured while conducting a military operation within and against this country. The custody and treatment of such prisoners
of war is an exclusively military responsibility. It is to be discharged, of course, in
the light of any obligation undertaken by our country under treaties or conventions or under customs and usages so generally accepted as to constitute the 'laws

of warfare.'").
59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536-37
(2004) CIlt would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest
that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis
for his detention by his Government, simply because the Executive opposes mak-

ing available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process."); Munaf v. Geren,
128 S.Ct. 2207 (2008).
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This question really deserves a normative answer. The real question is whether President Obama should have such an authority, a
much more interesting question in the long-run. Should statutory,
constitutional, and international law be changed to permit summary military detention of civilians in such circumstances?
To answer "yes" to this normative question, however, is to accept its implicit assumption of exceptionalism. The question assumes that we are living in an exceptional time that calls for exceptional departures from the ordinary legal order, departures that we
would not otherwise consider.r ° In ordinary times, we expect that a
U.S. citizen would enjoy constitutional protection from military seizure; but in this case, the question subtly asks, should we make an
exception? In ordinary times, the constitutional protection against
military seizure would be even stronger for a citizen living in Minnesota than one traveling from abroad; but in this case, should we
make an exception? In ordinary times, we assume that a citizen's
associations and "links" will not be sufficient conditions to deny
him constitutional protection; again, should we make an exception?
Perhaps the assumption most deeply buried in this question is
the one most people would most like to be true: this Minnesotan is
a loner, himself an exception, as John Walker Lindh (the "American Taliban") was hoped to be an exception from the "norm" of
foreign extremists. 6l Holding this assumption seems to soften the
60. The most famous twentieth-century proponent of this view was the Nazi
legal theoretician Carl Schmitt, hardly an advocate for the construction and de-

fense of democratic, rule-of-law institutions capable of withstanding national security emergencies.

CARL SCHMITT, POLMcAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE

CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922) ("So-

vereign is he who decides on the exception."); see also Adrian Vermuele, Our
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HAtv. L. REv. 1095, 1098-1101 (2009) (discussing Schmitt's "extreme" views that "law never constrains emergency power"); Lawrence Preuss, Punishment by Analogy in National Socialist PenalLaw, 26J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 847 (1936) (reporting Schmitt's call to replace nullum crimen sine lege
with nullum crimen sine poena in the context of reforming National Socialist penal
law).
61. The United States has generally chosen not to apply the laws of war to its
own citizens. President Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001, ordering the
military detention of members of al Qaeda, expressly states that U.S. citizens are
not "individual[s] ...subject to this order." Military Order of November 13, 2001:

Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001). The Military Commissions
Act exempts citizens from this system, even those who have engaged in hostilities
or purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009)
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blow exceptionalism delivers to our constitutional principles; its
rarity makes departure from them seem more excusable. But it is a
naive and dangerous assumption on which to build law or policy.
62
Narrowly defended exceptionalism always expands.
Jack
Goldsmith, Harvard Law professor and former assistant attorney
general for the Office of Legal Counsel, has already argued that
"the definition [of people subject
to detention] should extend to
63
U.S. citizens as well as to aliens.
Fears will grow that our assumptions about a distant and foreign enemy are misplaced. Maybe they are. Pressure will mount to
expand the authority to detain the enemy within.6 We should
draw strength from our constitutional principles and resist making
exceptions to them. We have not fared well as a nation when we
have succumbed to such fear-drenched temptations. I prefer the
counsel ofJustice Jackson to the theories of Carl Schmitt:
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks
us to do what many think would be wise, although it is
something the forefathers omitted. They knew what
emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready
(defining the term "unprivileged enemy belligerent") (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
948a(7)); id. § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2576 (limiting persons subject to commissions to
any "alien unprivileged enemy belligerent") (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948b(a),
948(c)).
62. This is always the case, and a strong reason for the structural protection of
liberty provided by distributing power-in peacetime as well as during waramong the branches of government. However, asJustice Jackson observed:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the
hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A
crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim
attributed to Napoleon that 'The tools belong to the man who can use
them." We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from
slipping through its fingers.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
63. Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 83.
64. See Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2009) ('This position is
limited to the authority upon which the Government is relying to detain the persons now being held at Guantanamo Bay. It is not, at this poin, meant to define the
contours of authority for military operations generally, or detention in other contexts.") (emphasis added).
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pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they
suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
S 65
emergencies.

65.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650.

